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The GSE Public-Private Hybrid Model Flunks Again: This Time It’s the Federal Home Loan Bank System (Part 2)

The Stoop (NYU Furman Center)

It describes how the GSE design defect had very publicly manifested itself in these institutions prior to their being taken over by the government via conservatorship in 2008. Like F&F, FHLB leadership teams are motivated to maximize profits. trillion of assets) and are the most well-known and studied GSEs. billion for fiscal 2024.

2008 59
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Government Mortgage Interest Rates: A Serious Discussion about the Intertwined Topics of Risk Adjustment and Cross-subsidies

The Stoop (NYU Furman Center)

This was described on the one hand as unfair, since it relied on overcharging low-risk borrowers “who had played by all the rules” and, on the other hand, as unduly incenting bad loans at the GSEs (by charging too little for high-risk loans) in a quasi-replay of the lead up to the mortgage bubble of 2005 to 2008.