Rebuilding Place in Urban Space

APRIL 27, 2024

I've written about relocation of DC government agencies over the years as a misguided economic development strategy (" The Reeves Center Myth Revisited ," 2011, " Office Buildings Won't Save Anacostia ," 2005).

2007 52

2007 Development 2014 Economic Development 52

The Stoop (NYU Furman Center)

MARCH 4, 2024

This included employing ex-government officials from both parties to aid their cause. As an example of their lobbying power, in 2004 and 2005 the George W. Another was their lobbying efforts, as the two GSEs became among the most powerful lobbying interests in Washington, D.C. It well reflects how much F&F are a hybrid of the two.

2008 88

2008 Legislation Housing 2004 88

Google Public Sector

DECEMBER 12, 2022

All of this was done through a CRADA, or Cooperative Research and Development Agreement, a common framework for research collaboration between government agencies and companies. In 2005, AFIP’s biorepository was transferred to the newly created Joint Pathology Center (JPC). During the transition, the DoD asked the U.S.

2005 80

2005 2020 2018 Public Health 80

The Stoop (NYU Furman Center)

APRIL 29, 2024

5 This is because the government has put considerable time and resources into developing lower downpayment alternatives that are still of acceptable credit quality to the government agencies that provide most mortgage credit today. percent) are being offered via the government mortgage agencies (e.g.,

Housing 59

Housing Regulations 2007 Article 59

Rebuilding Place in Urban Space

MARCH 24, 2023

From " Revisiting Vision Zero in DC and NYC ": Government has a bias for inaction*. A big issue is that transportation agencies (and government agencies more generally), even very good ones like NYCDOT, aren't always that proactive, and tend to not have "a sense of urgency" when it comes to action.

Transportation 52

Transportation Economic Development Sustainability Development 52

The Stoop (NYU Furman Center)

MAY 31, 2023

This was described on the one hand as unfair, since it relied on overcharging low-risk borrowers “who had played by all the rules” and, on the other hand, as unduly incenting bad loans at the GSEs (by charging too little for high-risk loans) in a quasi-replay of the lead up to the mortgage bubble of 2005 to 2008.

Government 52

Government 2008 Housing Implementation 52